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Abstract: Constitutions are social and historical artefacts that take part in the
government of humans. Based on a comparison of how contemporary ‘global’ and
historical ‘local’ constitutional documents establish power relations between
‘humans’ and their ‘government’, this article suggests that both types of documents
involve different constitutive logics. Global constitutional documents create a ‘new
normativity’ – a reversed constitution – that turns the historical relationship between
pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué on its head. Such documents shift the
primary responsibility for human rights from governments to humans. Research in
the academic field of global constitutionalism omits this constitutional reconfigura-
tion. By offering a more historically sensitive and reflexive account of constitution-
alization, the field of global constitutionalism can realize an as yet unexplored critical
potential.
Keywords: constituent power; constituted power; global constitutionaliza-
tion; heads of state; history; practice
I. Introduction
We, the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives …
(GCM 2019, A/RES/73/195)
From a constitutionalist perspective, these opening words of the Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) strike a discor-
dant note. They are out of tune with ‘We, the People’. But the GCM is only
one recent example of a fundamental reconfiguration of traditional consti-
tutional patterns.1 This article identifies a critical shift in constitutional
practice at the global level from the people to the executive. Compared with
1 Documents of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) have used such a wording since the






























































































































modern constitutional texts from the eighteenth century, more recent global
constitutional landmarks – such as the United Nations Charter
(UN Charter), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
human rights treaties, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – follow a different logic. These documents
reverse the historical relationship between pouvoir constituant and pouvoir
constitué. Yet academic treatment of global constitutionalism has neglected
this transformation.
To address this research gap, this article advances a comparison between
historical ‘local’ and contemporary ‘global’ constitutional documents.2 It
focuses on how such texts constitute the relations between humans and their
government, and argues that the similarities in the texts hide a critical shift
between pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué. Local constitutions and
global constitutions involve different, and indeed opposite, constitutive
logics. This suggests that these categories of documents belong to two
distinct constitutional practices, and that global constitutional practice
follows a historically novel pattern. Global constitutional practice turns
the relationship between constituent and constituted power upside down,
reversing the normative pattern of eighteenth-century constitutional prac-
tice. This inversion, in which the primary responsibility for protecting
human rights is placed on humans rather than governments, is referred to
as the reversed constitution.
This article stresses three particular dislocations of the human–govern-
ment relationship.3 First, in the eighteenth century humans held govern-
ments accountable for recognizing and respecting ‘the rights of man’
(i.e. humans). Today, governments assign the responsibility for the recog-
nition and respect of such rights to humans. Second, in the eighteenth
century humans established governments based on their rights, which
included the right to abolish governments encroaching on these rights.
Today, governments stipulate that humans exercise human rights and grant
themselves exceptional provisions. Finally, in the eighteenth century
humans declared their rights vis-à-vis governments through the medium
of representatives who had been authorized for this task. Today, govern-
ments authorize themselves to declare human rights and tell humans what
these rights imply. Thus, humans and governments have become decoupled
at the global level. This decoupling, as this article will show, is accompanied
2 Following scholarship on globalization, the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ are not considered to be
mutually exclusive (e.g. Sassen 2006).





























































































































by a replacement of politics with law and development as the means of
allowing humans to seek their rights.
The findings support the proposition that, at the global level, ‘a specific
type of constitutionalism has gained priority, and perhaps exclusivity, over
the principle of democracy’, which deviates from ‘the historical develop-
ment’ (Tully 2002a: 212). They also illustrate how important historical
contrast is for establishing a critical view of the present global constitutional
practice. This article draws a comparison between the UN Charter, the
UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, as global constitutional documents,
and the Virginia Bill of Rights (VBR), the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution of the United States of America (US Constitution), its Bill of
Rights, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (DRMC) and
the first French Constitution (FC), as eighteenth-century constitutional
documents. These texts are analysed as historically situated statements of
the relations between humans and their government.How they establish this
relationship (as a power effect) shapes the historical space for constitutional
imagination and conduct. The focus is inspired by work in fields like critical
legal studies and critical international relations scholarship (e.g. Bartelson
1995; Constantinou 2013; Kennedy 2007), specifically the relationship
between a Foucauldian notion of government as ‘a “conduct of conduct”’
(Foucault 1994: 341) and ‘the politics of rights’ (Golder 2015).4
This article first provides an overview of prominent accounts of the
constitution in global constitutionalism. It argues thatmore debate is needed
from a historical perspective on the self-transformative potential of the
constitution. Even accounts that view the constitution as a social process
tend to see constitutional continuity rather than contingency. The article
then proceeds to its main analysis, and explores the different patterns of
eighteenth-century constitutional practice and global constitutional practice
with regards to human-government relations. This analysis suggests that
eighteenth-century and global constitutional practice involve distinct con-
stitutive logics that are difficult to reconcile. The conclusion calls for scholars
to undertake further comparative historical analysis of constitutional prac-
tice since the eighteenth century, with particular sensitivity to modes of
governance.
4 For a political-theoretical argument for such an approach, see Tully (2002b). James Tully’s
work distinguishes between constitutions, which are fixed sets of rules, and constitutionalism,
which is an open-ended process of dialogue and negotiation between members of a democratic
society over the constitutive practices and norms of that society. Wiener (2008) develops the
implications of this distinction between constitutions and constitutionalism for global politics. I
thank Antje Wiener for pointing me to Tully’s work.




























































































































II. The constitution in global constitutionalism
Global constitutionalism is ‘an interdisciplinary … research field’ (Wiener
et al. 2012: 6), which responds to the challenges of globalization as well as
the related transformation of the nation-state and law (e.g. Dobner and
Loughlin 2010; Klabbers 2009; Wiener et al. 2012: 6). Cutting across
disciplines such as international law, international relations, political theory
and sociology, the field addresses an emerging ‘constitutional quality’ in a
previously ‘non-constitutional global realm’ (Wiener et al. 2012: 5). Thus,
concepts of the constitution structure the debate in the field. Although some
accounts are sensitive to the historical contingency of the constitution, these
accounts do not consider how the constitution is being remade at the global
level. This article argues that scholars must consider constitutional practice
with greater historical sensitivity to fully grasp how global constitutional
practice compares with past constitutional practice.
Many accounts observe the topic of global constitutionalization through
the lens of an ideal concept of the constitution. In doing so, these accounts
follow amodern constitutional tradition, traceable to the eighteenth century
(e.g. Fassbender 2009a, 2009b; Gardbaum 2008: 766–67; Grimm 2010:
5, 7–8; Kumm 2009: 261, 315; Paulus 2009: 90, 90 n 81, 92; Peters 2006:
584–85; Peters 2009c: 346; Preuß 2010: 37; Wahl 2010: 220).5 While
protagonists debate sites of global constitutionalization (e.g. Fassbender
2009a: 137, 145–47; Gardbaum 2009: 256–57; Macdonald 1999; critical
Dunoff 2009), or argue whether or not to apply constitutional semantics to
the global level (e.g. Paulus 2009: 108; Peters 2009a: 154-57, 198, 2006:
585; critical Grimm 2010: 21-22; Wahl 2010), and if so how (e.g. Besson
2009; Dunoff and Trachtman 2009: 10; Kumm 2009: 261-66; Preuß 2010;
critical Klabbers 2004), the corresponding vision of the constitution remains
relatively fixed. The constitution establishes, organizes and limits (legiti-
mate) political power based on legal norms (e.g. Fassbender 2009a: 139;
Gardbaum 2009: 233–34; Kumm 2009: 267; Paulus 2009: 75; Peters
2009c: 349; Preuß 2010: 43). Moreover, a canon of core constitutional
principles exists that includes separated powers, checks and balances, the
rule of law, human rights, state rights and democracy (Paulus 2009: 92; see
also Peters 2006: 582–83).6Many accounts also seek to adapt the idea that it
is the people, as the pouvoir constituant, who are the origin of the
5 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (1997: 422, 426, 428) assumes a history of several thousand years.
Usually, a modern constitutional tradition is associated with the American and French Revolu-
tions, though some include late-seventeenth-century England. In contrast, David Armitage’s
(2007) global history of declarations of independence also mentions, for example, Haiti.






























































































































constitution as the highest law (e.g. Besson 2009: 396–99; Gardbaum 2008:
756; Gardbaum2009: 241; Peters 2006: 599; Peters 2009a: 178–79; critical
Kumm 2009: 272). No doubt such accounts have great appeal – for exam-
ple, where they address legitimacy deficits resulting from a transfer of
political authority to the global level (e.g. Besson 2009: 384; Kumm 2009:
286–88, 296–301; Peters 2006: 592; Peters 2009b: 263–64; Peters 2009c:
351). However, analytically, they assess the constitutional present by the
standards of the past.7 This assumes modern constitutional continuity, and
omits that the constitution and its normative core are made and remade
(or at times unmade). Thus, the actual historical practice of the constitution
and its potential for self-transformation are sidelined and under-estimated.
This problem is addressed in more reflexive accounts that consider the
constitution in social context (e.g. Brunnée and Toope 2017; Gill and Cutler
2014; Kennedy 2008; Teubner 2012; Thornhill 2012, 2016; Walker 2007;
Wiener 2008). While some of these accounts stress the interaction of indi-
viduals who interpret legal norms,8 others point to language, grammar or
communication as a constitutive force.
Accounts that foreground intersubjectivity view the constitution as the
product of socially (re-)produced meaning – for example, context-
dependent subjective interpretations (Wiener 2008: 4) or ‘shared under-
standings’within ‘communities of legal practice’ (Brunnée and Toope 2017:
170, 174). Yet, although the constitution is conceived as a social phenom-
enon, the intersubjectivists leave the full analytical potential of this insight
untapped. Contrary to their aim to explain the constitution by its social
practice, such accounts still draw on a (pre-)configured idea of what the
constitution is. This includes the view that certain principles, such as the rule
of law, are required for a constitution (Brunnée and Toope 2017: 175–77)9
or that such principles indicate the (formal) constitutional character of
treaties agreed upon by governments (Wiener 2008: 10–11, 21–23). While
the making of the constitution is understood by researchers as an ongoing
social process, the standard for what comprises a constitution remains
outside that social process. Even if the historical situatedness and contin-
gency of this standard are commonly acknowledged, they are not further
explored.10
7 Paradigmatic is Bardo Fassbender’s (2009b: 285) view that ‘an established legal notion such
as “constitution” is malleable only to a certain degree’, even if ‘the constitutional idea in
international law must be understood as an autonomous concept rather than an extrapolation
from national constitutional law’.
8 For an overview of constructivist research in global constitutionalism, see Wilkens (2017).
9 On the rule of law as ‘a practice of legality’, see Brunnée and Toope (2011). For a critique of
the theory’s incorporation of LL Fuller’s criterion of legality, see Liste (2011: 592).
10 For an intersubjective account see Kratochwil (2018).




























































































































Accounts that stress the constitution as an effect of language, grammar or
communication have gone further. Notably, Chris Thornhill’s (2016) socio-
logical history of constitutions observes a shift in the grammar of rights from
a national to a human-rights frame since 1945. In this new stage of consti-
tutional evolution, legally (re-)produced (human-rights) norms – for exam-
ple, international and national court decisions – replace constituent power
as the basis of legitimacy and functional capacity (Thornhill 2016: 4, 12,
100–01). Yet, by assuming this shift to be a coherent adaptation of the
modern political system to rights-based pressures for inclusion, Thornhill’s
history domesticates the corresponding remaking of constitutional gover-
nance (2016: 8–9, 11–12, 28–30). Although the perspective highlights
actual historical practice and its historical contingency, this history conveys
a narrative of constitutional continuity and indeed necessity by privileging
functional considerations over constitutive logics.
Consequently, the sociological perspective of reflexive accounts points to
the constitution as an actual historical practice and raises the practice’s
historical contingency. Yet such accounts assume modern-constitutional
continuity rather than historical difference to analyse global constitutional-
ization. As Thornhill’s history also implies, the current global frame and
form of the constitution involve a rather substantial change. Research
therefore needs to continue unlocking the field of (contingent) historical
constitutionalization across time and scale to better grasp the global-
constitutional present in historical view. As more reflexive accounts of law
suggest, by confronting us with the contingent historical ‘limits of our
imagination’, historical contrast ‘provides a sense of the possibilities that
could exist today’ (Koskenniemi 2001: 5).11 In this vein, Martti Kosken-
niemi (2007: 22, 32, 14, 15) also contrasts constitutionalism as a, ‘Knowl-
edge of the law’ entailing a ‘critical attitude to law’ and amoral politics with
an increasingly prevalent ‘managerial jargon of “legitimate governance”’,
which reduces law to the interests of ‘rational egoists’.12 Applying such a
contrast to global constitutionalization can open a historical field of con-
tingent constitutionalization, allowing comparisons of global constitutional
practice. The next section demonstrates how the constitutive logic of con-
stitutional practice has been reversed through a comparison of global and
historical constitutionalization.
11 InTheGentle Civilizer, Koskenniemi (2001: 5) uses thismethod to revive a normative legal
position and struggle from which international lawyers still ‘could … learn’.
12 As a legal vocabulary and mindset, constitutionalism implies a (Kantian) ‘moral-political
project’ of universal freedom and the rule of (moral) law, and thus politicises law (Koskenniemi
2007: 32). Somewhat ironically, Koskenniemi’s example for a persisting constitutionalism is the
Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law of the International Law Commission,





























































































































III. Historical and global constitutional practice: Then and now
The remainder of the article explores the historicizing potential of a reflexive
account that contrasts constitutional practice. It compares constitutional
documents as historically situated statements of the relationship between
humans and their government. The comparison suggests that global consti-
tutional practice in the twentieth century reverses the constitutional practice
of the eighteenth century.
The comparison, as indicated above, uses the Virginia Bill of Rights, the
Declaration of Independence, the US Constitution, the US Bill of Rights, the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the first French Consti-
tution on the one hand, and the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of
HumanRights, the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights on the
other. In addition to being emblematic constitutional monuments, these
texts also are taken to represent constitutional continuity, given their
similarities – such as the UN Charter’s reference to ‘We the Peoples’
(e.g. Fassbender 2009a, 2009b). However, the same or similar words can
have quite different implications. This depends on the modality and the
practical-textual context of their utterance (Foucault 1972: 101–05). Con-
stitutional documents engage in founding a government of humans (Derrida
1986). In so doing, they follow a pattern that, as an (inter-)textual power
effect, circumscribes the space for the constitution as an art of government,
as a way of thinking, and of conduct (see Foucault 1980: 112–13; Foucault
1991: 78–82; Gordon 1980: 236–37). Furthermore, the selected documents
establish a government by referring to both a constitutional and a global
frame. As David Armitage’s (2007) global history of declarations of inde-
pendence suggests, the Declaration of Independence in the eighteenth cen-
tury ‘inaugurated a genre of political writing’ – that is, ‘a distinct but
repeatable structure of argument and literary form’ (2007: 13–14). This
genre was globalized (2007: 3–5). The Declaration of Independence con-
tributed to the conception and themaking of aworld of states, andwas itself
situated within a global web of social exchange (2007: 3–4, 10–23). As
Armitage (2007: 14) reminds us, however:
Genres are born. They break apart and recombine with elements of other
genres. Sometimes they die. Like the ideas they contain, they are both
movable and mutable, and they do not recognize national borders.
To establish whether the documents are similar or different, this analysis
focuses on how the relations between ‘humans’ and their ‘government’ are
constituted. Such a comparison may seem trivial. Following the modern
constitutional tradition, the constitution as a subordination of governments




























































































































to the will of the people may seem self-evident; however, this has never been
the case. How constitutions govern also has to do with the power operating
in and across such texts. The focus on the establishment of the relations
between ‘humans’ and their ‘government’ can, of course, only be the starting
point.
The comparison emphasizes the documents’ opening and closing pas-
sages, but uses further passages for clarification. Following Jacques Derrida
and Cornelia Vismann, the opening and closing passages hold important
insight. Derrida (1986: 8) reveals the intricate relationship between the
‘instituting act’, such as a constitution, and its ‘actual signer’, such as ‘the
people’. Vismann (2011: 39–40) argues that preambles situate law within a
historical context and aim to govern the interpretation of law, but thus
‘contaminate’ legal claims to timeless generality with historicity.13 To trace
constitutional documents as statement-events in their space and time, the
presentation proceeds chronologically. The next section elaborates on the
pattern of the eighteenth-century constitutional documents, starting with
the constitution of humans and their relationship to their government. This
provides the basis for comparison of such a pattern with the twentieth-
century constitutional documents, which is explored in the second step.
Rights as the basis and limit of government: Eighteenth-century
constitutional patterns
The Virginia Bill of Rights describes itself as, ‘ADeclaration of Rights made
by the representatives of the good people of Virginia’. But these rights
predate this act.14 The Virginia Bill of Rights attributes rights to the Virgin-
ian people and ‘their posterity’ as human beings by virtue of nature.15 It
states the Virginian people ‘are by nature… free and independent and have
… inherent rights’ (VBR: Section 1). These rights relate to ‘the enjoyment of
life and liberty’ and the means necessary to this end – namely, the pursuit of
‘property… happiness and safety’ (VBR: Section 1). Because rights originate
in nature, the Virginian people generally ‘cannot, by any compact, deprive’
13 The First Commission, for example, following Hans Kelsen (1946: 143, see also 142),
understood the UNCharter’s preamble as informing the treaty’s interpretation and as having ‘the
same binding force’.
14 On the undecidability between the constative and the performative, see Derrida (1986:
9–10).
15 For a discussion of the exclusion of women, slaves and native Americans in US constitu-
tional history, see Lepore (2018). For a discussion of slavery in the context of the French
Revolution and constitution, see Covo (2015). The FC distinguishes between citizens and active
citizens. I thank one anonymous reviewer for pointing me to the issue of exclusion and Lepore’s
book. Given its focus and limited space, this article cannot dwell on the constitution of ‘humans’.





























































































































future generations of these (VBR: Section 1). When humans form a society
they, as the people, are – and remain – the source of ‘all power’, while any
power exercised over them must be to ‘their common benefit’ (VBR:
Section 2, 3; see also Section 5, 15).16
The Virginian people, ‘their posterity’ and their ‘representatives’ all
appear as having and rightfully invoking such rights. The Virginia Bill of
Rights describes the representatives as ‘assembled in full and free conven-
tion’. This implies that they do so as a complete body and of their own
accord, which resonates with the principles of human freedom and inde-
pendence and the right to enjoy ‘life and liberty’ (VBR: Section 1). However,
the representatives relate to the Virginian people as a means to an end. As
humans, the people, have the right to use means suited to attain ‘life and
liberty’ (VBR: Section 1), the representatives’ ‘representativity’ (Derrida
1986: 10) deriving therefrom.
Finally, the Virginian Bill of Rights’ opening passage determines that the
rights declared within provide ‘the basis and foundation’ for ‘government’.
Any government over the Virginian people therefore must originate from
and express these rights. The government is distinct from the people and
their descendants. Its representatives are elected by the people ‘in assembly’
that ‘ought to be free’, all having ‘the right of suffrage’ – provided that they
are ‘men’ and display ‘permanent common interest with, and attachment to,
the community’ (VBR: Section 6; see also Section 3, 5). Government repre-
sentatives also differ from the representativeswho declare theVirginia Bill of
Rights. In any case, the opening passage states that it is the rights of the
Virginian people, their future generations and their (current) representatives
that from that point onward are at the basis of any government. After the
Virginia Bill of Rights has been declared, ‘government is, or ought to be,
instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security’ and done in such
a way as to inhibit oppressive tendencies of ‘the legislative and executive
powers of the state’ (Section 3, 5; see also Sections 7–9, 12, 13, 15–16).
Crucially, in relation to ‘any government… found inadequate or contrary to
these purposes’, the Virginia Bill of Rights gives the Virginian people –
precisely, their majority – ‘an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right
to reform, alter, or abolish it’ (Section 3).
What characterizes the Virginia Bill of Rights is thus a constitution of
humans as being ‘by nature equally free and independent’ – that is, they are
individuals – and possessing rights (Section 1; but see fn 15). These rights
and attributes therefore appear as predating the Virginia Bill of Rights
while also being possessed by humans as ‘the people, nation, or community’
16 ‘That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; the magistrates are
their trustees and servants and at all times amenable to them’ (VBR: Section 2).




























































































































(Section 3). All this establishes the people, as humans, as the basis of any
governing authority exercised over them. Any act claiming to represent or
govern the people must originate from their rights as humans. Such an act is
thus narrowed to upholding these rights and is limited by them. Only in this
way can this act be coextensive with – that is, indistinguishable from – the
people and their exercise of their rights. At the same time, the people, as
humans, can resist and can replace any such wrongful act, by virtue of their
rights.
The Declaration of Independence displays the same pattern. Its conclud-
ing passage states: ‘We, … the Representatives of the united States of
America, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of
our intentions, do, in theName, and byAuthority of the goodPeople of these
Colonies, solemnly publish and declare’ the Declaration of Independence.
These representatives therefore act on behalf of the people’s will and at their
behest. The people are associatedwith ‘these [c]olonies’ that form ‘the united
States ofAmerica’ and are qualified as ‘good’ (Declaration of Independence).
Moreover, theDeclaration of Independence attributes rights to the people as
human beings. These rights are ‘unalienable’ and include ‘Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness’ (Declaration of Independence). The role of ‘[g]
overnments’ is to ensure that humans enjoy such rights (Declaration of
Independence):
We [the representatives] hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
– That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a
new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing
its Powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness. (Declaration of Independence)
The rights of humans thus oblige the government in particular to enable
humans to exercise these rights. Yet these rights also impose a duty on
humans themselves. Humans must defend their rights against a government
that ‘becomes destructive’ of its responsibility ‘to secure these rights’
(Declaration of Independence). However, ‘prudence’ demands that humans
do not resort hastily to resistance and change and turn to suchmeans only in
grave circumstances (Declaration of Independence). Given humans’ rights, a
government exercises ‘just powers’ only based on ‘the consent of the gov-





























































































































The Declaration of Independence traces the origin of humans’ rights to
God, as the ‘Creator’. This foundation lends weight to these rights, as God
speaks both the truth and the law (Derrida 1986: 12). It also bolsters the
people’s assertion of these rights via representatives, as well as the claim that
the authority of both the current representatives and the representatives of
any future government depends solely on the people’s will, whose authority
derives directly from God.
AsDerrida (1986: 11–12) notes, by ‘appealing to the Supreme Judge of the
world’, the Declaration of Independence invokes another authority – ‘this
ultimate signature’ – in addition to the people and the representatives they
have authorized. On Derrida’s (1986: 11) reading, this invocation guaran-
tees ‘the whole game’, as God ‘founds natural laws’, and certifies ‘the
rectitude of popular intentions, the unity and goodness of the people’. By
appealing to supreme authority, the representatives also ask God to punish
them if their own ‘intentions’ (Declaration of Independence) were dishon-
ourable. In any case, the appeal signals to the people that the representatives
are trustworthy, while indicating to the British Crown that resistance is in
vain. The combination of this appeal and the absence of a divine objection to
it both supports the representatives’ authority to act ‘in theName of’ and ‘by
Authority of the good People’ and lends the represented people integrity
(Declaration of Independence). This divinely seals the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.
By invoking God, the Declaration of Independence does not follow a
pattern different from that of the Virginia Bill of Rights. In comparison, it
solely explicates God as the source of humans’ rights.17 This underscores the
truth of such rights and imposes a divine duty on humans to exercise them.
Ultimately, this gives humans, as the people, the task of ensuring that their
rights are (and remain) at ‘the basis and foundation of [any] government’
(VBR). The Declaration of Independence, like the Virginia Bill of Rights,
thus conceives humans as having rights by ‘the Laws of Nature and of
Nature’s God’ qua their being human (Declaration of Independence). For
this reason, any governing authority exercised over the people requires their
consent, which in turn presupposes that representatives and the government
abide by and foster humans’ rights. If this is not the case, the people, as
humans, can – and indeedmust – resist, given their duty to stand up for their
rights.
The US Constitution and the Bill of Rights support this pattern of the
human–government relationship. The US Constitution’s opening and clos-
ing passages establish ‘We the People of the United States’, represented by
17 The VBR leaves the relationship between God and nature implicit. It traces humans’ rights
to nature and refers to God as ‘our Creator’ (VBR: Section 2, 16).




























































































































‘the States present’, as this constitution’s ultimate subject(s).18 Furthermore,
the concluding passage presents the US Constitution as the Declaration of
Independence’s culmination.19 Noteworthy are also the 9th and 10th
amendments,20 as they invoke rights that the people of the American states
possessed prior to the US Constitution:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people. (Amendment 9)
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people. (Amendment 10)
The US Constitution and the Bill of Rights, like the Virginia Bill of Rights
and the Declaration of Independence, thus conceive the people as having
rights prior to these documents. They also conceive the people as the origin
of any government over themwhile requiring any such government to abide
by the people’s rights and enable the exercise thereof. If government repre-
sentatives do not act accordingly, the Bill of Rights allows the people ‘to
petition the government for a redress of grievances’ (Amendment 1), the US
Constitution being also amendable (Article V). Additionally, representatives
can be impeached and, upon conviction, can be dismissed.21 If none of these
means is available, the people may ultimately abolish a wrongful govern-
ment, including the Constitution of the United States, ‘its foundation’
(Declaration of Independence). This seems at least to be implied in the Bill
of Rights’ stipulation that rights not listed by it or the US Constitution are
‘retained by the people’.22
18 Remarkably, the US Constitution stipulates that, ‘The Ratification of the Conventions of
nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying’ (Article VII).
19 The passage links both by the way it counts: ‘the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year
of our Lord … and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth’
(US Constitution).
20 According to its opening passage, the Bill of Rights aims ‘to prevent Misconstruction or
Abuse of its [the US Constitution] Powers’ by stipulating ‘further declaratory and restrictive
Clauses…: And as extending the Ground of public Confidence in theGovernment will best insure
the beneficent Ends of its Institution.’
21 This includes ‘The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States’who
‘shall be removed fromOffice on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ (US Constitution: Article II, Section 4).
22 This interpretation is solely based on textual analysis. As indicated above, the Declaration
of Independence and the VBR hold that the decision to abolish a government must not be taken
lightly. It requires ‘a long train of abuses and usurpations’ (Declaration of Independence) and





























































































































To further underscore the pattern, it is necessary, finally, to turn to the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and the French Constitu-
tion. Both documents constitute humans and government by repeating the
pattern already observed above. As the Declaration of the Rights of Man’s
opening passage indicates, ‘Les représentans du peuple François, constitués
en assemblée nationale … ont résolu d’exposer, dans une déclaration
solemnelle, les droits naturels, inaliénables et sacrés de l’homme’. This
declaration aims to continually remind ‘tous les membres du corps social’
of both their rights and the corresponding duties (DRMC). The document
thus seeks to enable the people to judge both legislative and executive acts
against humans’ rights, these rights being ‘le but de toute institution poli-
tique’ (DRMC; see alsoArticle II). These rights are delineated as ‘la liberté, la
propriété, la sûreté et la résistance à l’oppression’ (DRMC: Article II). The
opening passage also indicates that the representatives consider the igno-
rance and oblivion of, as well as the disdain for, humans’ rights ‘les seules
causes desmalheurs publics et de la corruption des gouvernemens’ (DRMC).
They recognize and declare these rights ‘en présence et sous les auspices de
l’Être suprême’ (DRMC).
By associating the verb exposer and the adjective naturel with the rights
declared by it, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen
emphasizes these as not being invented by the representatives, but as existing
prior to their declaration. Article I underscores this by stating: ‘Les hommes
naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits; les distinctions sociales ne
peuvent être fondées que sur l’utilité commune’ (DRMC). By additionally
using the verb résoudre in relation to the representatives, this declaration
further points to representatives making a decision before declaring these
rights. However, this does not solely imply that the representatives have the
authority to do so on behalf of the French people as humans. Rather, it
points to the representatives’ reasons for and the consequences of their act.
After all, they expose the rights of humans as the sole ‘basis and foundation
of’ (VBR) any authority or government over the French people and humans
in general, and in doing so they invoke God, both as a witness and as a
protector.
Similar to the Declaration of Independence, this appeal to God attests to
both the truthfulness of the representatives’ intentions and evinces the truth
and law of humans’ rights. But the Declaration of the Rights ofMan, unlike
the Declaration of Independence, expressly addresses all humans, as citi-
zens.23 Accordingly, this appeal solidifies the truth that the rights declared
23 This is not say that both do not resonate with each other historically. As indicated above,
the Declaration of Independence addresses ‘the … People of these Colonies’, who dissolve their
ties to the (British) Crown, and a ‘candid [i.e. honest, truth-loving] world’.




























































































































apply to all humans, as citizens, and that these rights are declared on their
behalf. TheDeclaration of theRights ofMan in this way empowers humans,
as the people and citizens, vis-à-vis governments everywhere, but it also
imposes duties on them. As Article III states: ‘Le principe de toute souver-
aineté réside essentiellement dans la nation. Nul corps, nul individu ne peut
exercer d’autorité qui n’en émane expressément.’ (DRMC) Article IV adds:
La liberté consiste à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit pas à autrui. Ainsi,
l’exercice des droits naturels de chaque homme n’a de bornes que celles qui
assurent aux autres membres de la société la jouissance de ces mêmes
droits. Ces bornes ne peuvent être déterminées que par la loi. (DRMC)
Consequently, the Declaration of the Rights of Man makes ‘principes
simples et incontestables’ available to humans, as citizens, for lodging
complaints that preserve the ‘Constitution’ and the ‘bonheur de tous’. The
constitution here means ‘la garantie des droits’ and ‘la séparation des
pouvoirs’, the absence of which would mean that there is no constitution
(DRMC: Article XVI). Moreover, the appeal to God by the representatives
also solidifies the truth that they themselves apply the declared rights as
guidance. As the opening passage of the French Constitution – which
follows a reproduction of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen – highlights, ‘[l’]Assemblée nationale’ intends to implement by
means of this constitution ‘les principes qu’elle vient de reconnaître et de
déclarer’.24
The constitutional logic of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
French Constitution then follows the same pattern as the Virginia Bill of
Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the US Constitution and the Bill of
Rights: humans possess rights by nature as human beings, but they can only
realize these by means of government – that is, as citizens. Any authority or
government, including the ‘assemblée nationale’, must therefore be based on
humans’ rights and be to humans’ benefit. Any authority or government
must thus abide by the rights of humans while also being contained by these
rights. If their representatives disobey these rights, humans have a right (and
duty) to resort to (legal) punishment or, ultimately, resistance and/or regime
change.25
24
‘L’Assemblée nationale voulant établir la Constitution française sur les principes qu’elle
vient de reconnaître et de déclarer, abolit irrévocablement les institutions qui blessaient la liberté et
l’égalité des droits.’ (FC)
25 As theDRMCholds: ‘Ceux qui sollicitent, expédient, exécutent ou font exécuter des ordres
arbitraires, doivent être punis’ (Article VII). Its Article II, as indicated, gives humans the right to
resist oppression, while Article VI establishes that: ‘La loi est l’expression de la volonté générale;
tous les citoyens ont droit de concourir personnellement, ou par leurs représentans, à sa forma-





























































































































In summary, these diverse constitutional documents are all marked by the
same pattern. In the first place, these documents all ascribe rights to humans,
granted by nature andGod. For this reason, these rights appear as preceding
these documents. This is clearest in the Declaration of Independence, which
takes these rights to be ‘self-evident truths’, but this antecedence of rights
also characterizes the other texts. This both empowers humans to be the
ultimate authors of their lives – that extends to their government – and
imposes a duty on them to exercise these rights for their own benefit. Anyone
whose life deviates from these rights violates the truth. The same goes for any
government or authority. Yet, to live in accordance to these rights, humans
are presented in the documents as requiring representatives, (representative)
government and the law. Second, the documents conceive any such authority
as flowing from humans, as the people, who in the process become citizens.
This vesting of authority is seen as conditional. It continues only when the
rights of humans are adhered to and promoted. It is under this condition that
representatives, government and the law can appear as being coextensivewith
the people, as humans. Finally, the documents conceptualize the relationship
between humans and their government as involving necessity, peril and an
asymmetry of rights. These documents describe humans as requiring a gov-
ernment only for the benefit of their rights. By founding a government,
humans do not relinquish their rights to this. As a result, the government
paradoxically appears to be ultimately responsible and accountable for
upholding humans’ rights, but is simultaneously the greatest threat to them
as well. Given that humans retain their rights, these rights can be realized in
the case of a government that consistently shows no respect for them.
The eighteenth-century constitutional documents thus establish a shared
responsibility between humans and their government for the human reali-
zation of rights. But the primary responsibility for the recognition of these
rights lies with the government, with the purpose of enabling humans to
enjoy them.Humansmust protect their rights should a government refuse to
do so. As the next section argues, it is this constellation that global consti-
tutional practice has refashioned since the mid-twentieth century.
Reversing constitutionalization at the United Nations
Global constitutional documents have frequently been officially presented as
continuing amodern constitutional tradition,most prominently by theUnited
constituted powers individually and that: ‘Le Pouvoir législatif ne pourra faire aucunes lois qui
portent atteinte et mettent obstacle à l’exercice des droits … garantis par la Constitution; mais
comme la liberté ne consiste qu’à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit ni aux droits d’autrui, ni à la
sûreté publique, la loi peut établir des peines contre les actes qui, attaquant ou la sûreté publique
ou les droits d’autrui, seraient nuisible à la société.’




























































































































Nations Charter’s reference to the US Constitution;26 Eleanor Roosevelt’s
(1948) description of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as ‘the
international Magna Carta’ updating the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen and the Bill of Rights; and the name ‘International Bill of Rights’
given to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) by the UN
General Assembly (UNGA) (1948, A/RES/3/217). This section therefore
studies how the UN Charter, the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, as
global constitutional documents, constitute ‘humans’ and their ‘government’.
As will be demonstrated, these documents break – and in fact reverse – the
pattern of the eighteenth-century constitutional practice previously analysed.
The UN Charter’s preamble opens with the words: ‘We the peoples of the
United Nations [UN]’. These peoples have decided to jointly pursue common
objectives in the interests of humanity, which they thus represent. They
reiterate their belief that humans, as individuals and collectives, have equal
‘fundamental human rights’ and personal ‘dignity andworth’ (UNCharter).27
They aim to avoid wars, support justice and international law, and to further
social advancement and freedom (UNCharter). To ‘these ends’, these peoples
want to ‘live together in peace’, cooperate tomaintain ‘international peace and
security’, use ‘armed force’ only ‘in the common interest’ and promote the
progress of all peoples in economic and social terms (UN Charter). They thus
intend to ‘combine… [their] efforts’ and submit to ‘principles’, ‘methods’ and
‘international machinery’ (UN Charter). It is under this condition that their
‘respective Governments [–] through representatives assembled in … San
Francisco’ whose powers were verified – do ‘agree[d] to the’ UN Charter
‘and hereby establish… the’ UN (UN Charter).28
Accordingly, the UN Charter’s preamble conceives humans as having
human rights and dignity. Yet it ties the truth of such rights and dignity to
humans’ ‘faith’ (UN Charter). What comes to the fore is a new pattern that
links the significance of human rights to humans’ recognition of these rights.
Thismakes humans primarily responsible for the creation of aworld inwhich
such rights reign. Governments are conceived as assisting humans in this task,
provided that humans first accept their own shared responsibility for this
endeavour. The governments consent to the UN Charter and found the UN
only after their peoples, as members and representatives of humankind, have
26 A report by the First Commission indicates that this was a conscious act (quoted in Kelsen
1946: 137 n 4).
27 The notion of fundamental rights generally refers to the constitution.
28 Katja Freistein and Philip Liste (2012: 89) also note that it is the governments’ represen-






























































































































(been) committed (again) to recognize human rights. Therefore, the United
Nations is an organization of governments that support and guide their
people’s realization of human rights. Counter-intuitively, the UN Charter’s
preamble then gives humans, rather than governments, the primary obligation
to fulfil human rights. Moreover, in an ironic twist, it (inter-)governmentally
authorizes government representatives to speak for, and thus represent, the
UN peoples, as humanity, and to testify to these peoples’ good intentions.
Compared with the pattern of eighteenth-century constitutional practice,
this marks a fundamental difference. The new pattern is underscored by the
articles of the UN Charter. For example, Article 1 gives the United Nations
four tasks. The first is ‘To maintain international peace and security’
(UN Charter). The second and third tasks are ‘To develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples’, as one means, among others, ‘to strengthen
universal peace’, and ‘To achieve international co-operation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction’ (UN Charter: Article
1; see also Article 55). These two tasks imply that human rights and respect
for them are issues relating primarily to nations, peoples and their con-
duct.29 Article 1 links ‘universal peace’ to ‘friendly relations among
nations’,30 which in turn require ‘nations’ to observe their ‘equal rights’
and the ‘self-determination of peoples’ as a ‘principle’ (UN Charter). The
fourth task of the United Nations – ‘To be a center for harmonizing the
actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends’ (UN Charter:
Article 1) – fits well with the emerging pattern. Article 1 thus basically gives
representatives of governments the task of jointly overseeing the mutual
conduct of nations and peoples,31 a conduct that is considered central to
humans’ realization of equal human rights, but one that is also precarious.
The following pattern thus characterizes the United Nations Charter: All
humans have human rights and personal dignity. However, in contrast to
29 The UN Charter distinguishes between ‘states’ and ‘authority’, on the one hand, and
‘nations’ and ‘peoples’, one the other (see also Chapter XII, XIII; for a different view, see Kelsen
1946: 150–51).
30 This relates the absence of ‘respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples’ to the primary task of the United Nations (UN Charter: Article 1).
31 The members of the United Nations are ‘peace-loving states’ that sign and ratify the UN
Charter (Article 4). The United Nations is not ‘authorize[d] … to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII’ (UN Charter: Article 7). Generally, the
members participate in the UNGA and the Security Council through representatives appointed by
them (UN Charter: Article 9, 23).




























































































































the eighteenth-century constitutional documents, these rights take effect
only when humans believe in them and behave accordingly. Governments
cooperate with each other to assist and supervise their peoples’ realization of
their human rights and, if necessary, enforce humans’ shared responsibility
in this task.
The UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR solidify this pattern. The
UDHR’s preamble, like that of the UNCharter, conceives humans as having
equal human rights and personal dignity, which it further specifies as
‘inalienable’ from and ‘inherent’ in them as ‘members of the human family’
– that is, their being human. Along with this, it ties the possibility of
achieving ‘freedom, justice, and peace in the world’ to the recognition of
these rights and dignity (UDHR).32 As it emphasizes, the absence of such a
recognition has led to ‘barbarous actswhich have outraged the conscience of
mankind’ (UDHR). Yet the UNpeoples ‘have in the Charter reaffirmed their
faith in’ human rights and dignity, and have decided to further social
advancement and freedom (UDHR). Consequently, it is primarily humans’
task to recognize and realize these. In fact, the preamble presents the UDHR
‘as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’,
addressing ‘every individual and every organ of society’.33 By proclaiming
the UDHR, the UN ‘Member States’, as the UNGA, in turn deliver on their
promise in the UN Charter ‘to achieve’, together with the United Nations,
‘the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms’ (UDHR). To this end, ‘a common understanding of
these rights and freedoms’ is crucial (UDHR). Above all, this makes humans
the primary actors. By ‘keeping this Declaration constantly in mind’, it is
individuals and civil society who ‘shall strive by teaching and education to
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures,
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition
and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction’ (UDHR).
The UDHR’s preamble again makes humans, not governments, primarily
responsible for the realization of human rights. It links such a realization, first
and foremost, to humans’ recognition of these rights and corresponding
conduct. This realization is portrayed as the objective of the UN peoples
who, given this objective, represent ‘the commonpeople’ (UDHR). In contrast,
32 Freedom here means ‘freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want… as
the highest aspiration of the common people’ (UDHR).
33 Although the notion of ‘organ of society’may at first seem to include governments and their
representatives, it only implies civil society, given the additional use of thewords ‘Member States’,
‘General Assembly’, and ‘territories’ (UDHR).Humans are classedwith civil society, alternatively






























































































































the UN ‘Member States’ – that is, governments and their representatives – are
given the sole task – ‘in cooperationwith the UN’ – of fostering the observance
of human rights by the member states’ peoples (UDHR). It seems that gov-
ernments accomplish a large share of this task by agreeing on themeaning and
implications of such rights, thus enabling humans to do likewise (UDHR). By
thismeans, governments not only support humans’ quest for human rights but
also shape it according to their understanding of these rights. The UDHR thus
contrasts strongly with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen declares human and
citizen rights, as well as the duties they imply, vis-à-vis governments, and in
doing so seeks to enable humans, as citizens, to check their government and its
actions.
The UDHR’s articles further underscore the pattern. For example, Article
1 asks humans to ‘act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’, given
their freedom and equality ‘in dignity and rights’ by birth and their shared
faculties of ‘reason and conscience’ (UDHR). In the same vein, Article
29 UDHR determines:
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only
to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order
and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
This article is the only one in theUDHR that refers expressly to ‘duties’, and
it imposes these on humans generally rather than specifically on states. Apart
from that, theUDHR solely specifies human rights as entitlements rather than
as duties, and articulates the general implications of these entitlements for
social order and human conduct. It attributes these rights to humans, as both
individuals and groups, vis-à-vis each other and society; the law and law
enforcement agencies; the state government; and the economy. Regarding the
state government, Article 21 stipulates that, ‘Everyone has the right to take
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives’, and ‘to equal access to public service’ (UDHR). The Article
continues:
Thewill of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equiv-
alent free voting procedures. (UDHR: Article 21)




























































































































This formulation is both weak and intricate. This condition is fully appar-
ent only in comparison with eighteenth-century constitutional documents,
including the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, alluded to by
the UDHR’s title. Article III of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen states: ‘Leprincipe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la
nation. Nul corps, nul individu ne peut exercer d’autorité qui n’en émane
expressément.’34 In contrast, theUDHR invokes ‘thewill of the people’ as ‘the
basis of the authority of government’ solely to ensnare this will immediately
by stipulating that it ‘shall be expressed in … elections’. As it is the UN
‘Member States’ that ‘proclaim’ the UDHR, this reverses the eighteenth-
century constitutional practice of forming the human–government relation-
ship in terms of constituent and constituted power. This tendency to reverse is
already implied in theUDHR’s preamble, especially its statement that ‘human
rights should be protected by the rule of law’ to liberate humans from the need
to ultimately resist unjust authority violently.35 This wording suggests that it
is this need, not the unjust government, that is problematic for humans in the
first place and must therefore be eliminated. It also suggests that the UDHR
aims, among other things, to keep humans from seeing such a need in relation
to the states that are proclaiming the UDHR. Lastly, this wording does not
invoke a right, and thus contrasts evenmore stronglywith eighteenth-century
constitutional practice.36
The ICCPR and the ICESCR share and sharpen this pattern. After reiter-
ating ‘principles proclaimed in’ theUNCharter and theUDHR,37 their shared
preamble states that ‘the ideal of free human beings… can only be achieved if
conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political
rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights’ (ICCPR/ICESCR).38
The preamble indicates that the ICCPR and the ICESCR serve to ensure that
‘[t]he States Parties’ cater for such conditions, and thus ‘promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms’, as is their
‘obligation…under the’UNCharter.Ultimately, though, ‘[t]he States Parties’
34 The other eighteenth-century constitutional documents analysed contain similar passages –
see, for example, the VBR (Section 2), the Declaration of Independence, the FC (‘Titre III’).
35
‘Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law
…’ (UDHR)
36 As already indicated above, the Declaration of Independence holds that ‘it is the Right of
the People to alter or to abolish’ a government that becomes ‘destructive of’ humans’ rights
(emphasis added). For further examples, see the VBR (Section 3) and the DRMC (Article II).
37 The preamble solely adds ‘that these rights [‘equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family’] derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’ (ICCPR/ICESCR), thus
further underscoring that such rights in principle inhere in human beings qua their being human.
38 ‘[I]n accordance with the’ UDHR, this ideal implies ‘civil and political freedom and





























































































































understand that ‘the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the
community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the
promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant’
(ICCPR/ICESCR). Governments thus again make humans primarily respon-
sible for the realization of rights. In contrast, they give themselves the task of
explicating the meaning and implications of these rights as well as of creating
an institutional framework for the human pursuit of these rights.
In this vein, the ICCPR and the ICESCR’s shared Article 1,39 for example,
attributes ‘the right of self-determination’ to ‘all peoples’, allowing them to
‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development’ and, ‘for their own ends, freely dispose
of their natural wealth and resources’. In turn, ‘The States Parties … shall
promote the realization of’ this ‘and shall respect that right’ (ICCPR/
ICESCR: Article 1). This commits governments to support peoples who
establish themselves as independent political communities,40 including
others’ recognition of their right to do so. It also commits governments to
honour this right as long as these peoples’ aspirations do not contravene the
‘provisions’ of the UN Charter (ICCPR/ICESCR: Article 1). Therefore, to
have their ‘right of self-determination’ furthered and respected by govern-
ments, peoples must exercise it consistent with that of other peoples and
without posing a ‘threat[s] to the peace’ (UN Charter: Article 1). They must
further use ‘their natural wealth and resources’ without compromising
‘obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based on
the principle of mutual benefit, and international law’ (ICCPR/ICESCR:
Article 1).41 The ICCPR and the ICESCR only conditionally grant peoples
such a right, with governments determining when its exercise is acceptable.
This is another instance of the reversal of the relationship between humans
and government characteristic of eighteenth-century constitutional practice.
Moreover, the ICCPR’s Article 4 allows ‘the States Parties’ in a situation
of ‘public emergency’ to temporarily curtail or suspend some of the stipu-
lated civil and political rights of humans,42 except those listed in ‘articles
39 Articles 1–5 of both treaties are similar, and at some points identical.
40 Referring to Article 1, the UN Charter’s Article 76 relates self-determination to ‘self-
government or independence’. Similarly, the so-called Friendly Relations-Declaration relates
‘self-determination’ to the absence of ‘external interference’ and gives ‘every State … the duty
to respect this right in accordance with the [UN Charter’s] provisions’. This declaration also
distinguishes states as governments from nations or peoples as humans.
41 Article 1 further specifies that, ‘In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence’ (ICCPR/ICESCR).
42 Such a situation ‘threatens the life of the nation and … is officially proclaimed’ (ICCPR:
Article 4). It allows derogations from the ICCPR ‘to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
…, provided that suchmeasures are not inconsistent with… other obligations under international
law and do not involve discrimination’. Governments must ‘immediately inform the other States




























































































































6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16, and 18’.43 In fact, in relation tomost
rights listed in it, the ICCPR allows ‘restrictions’ or ‘limitations’ that ‘are
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order
(ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others,
and are consistent with the other rights recognized’ (Article 12; see also
Article 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22).44 In the national or human interest, govern-
ments can always constrain humans’ civil and political rights and the
exercise thereof.45 In contrast, humans are given a continuous ‘responsibil-
ity to strive for the promotion and observance of’ such rights in relation to
each other (ICCPR: preamble). Regarding governments, finally, the
ICCPR’s Article 25 solely determines that:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.
This formulation is even weaker and more intricate than its UDHR
counterpart. It replaces the UDHR’s (Article 29) feeble notion of ‘the
Parties’of such a derogation and ‘the Provisions’ concerned and indicate both its ‘reasons’ and ‘the
date on which it terminates such derogation’ (ICCPR: Article 4). Thus, it is governments that
determine an emergency situation and the measures it requires.
43 Non-derogable are (only) the ‘Right to life (art 6)’; ‘[p]rohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment’ and ‘medical or scientific experimentation without
consent (art 7)’; ‘Prohibition of slavery, slave trade, and servitude (art 8)’; ‘Prohibition of
imprisonment because of inability to fulfil contractual obligations (art 11)’; ‘Principle of legality
in criminal law … (art 15)’; ‘Recognition everywhere as a person before the law (art 16)’;
‘Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art 18)’: see OHCHR (2013).
44 This includes ‘the right to liberty of movement’, but ‘the right to enter’ one’s ‘own country’
cannot arbitrarily be denied; ‘the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ and
religious practice; ‘the right to hold opinions without interference’, ‘to freedom of expression’
and ‘to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds’; ‘the right of peaceful
assembly’ and ‘to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade
unions’ (ICCPR: Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22).
45 It seems that nothing in the eighteenth-century constitutional documents analysed com-
pares with the ICCPR’s notion of ‘public emergency’ and its consequences. The FC, for example,
states: ‘Le Pouvoir législatif ne pourra faire aucunes lois qui portent atteinte et mettent obstacle à
l’exercice des droits naturels et civils consignés dans le présent titre [I], et garantis par la
Constitution’, including the right to peaceful assembly, but the law can punish acts that under-





























































































































people’with ‘citizen[s]’ as ‘electors’ (ICCPR: Article 25). These electors are
firmly situated within the constituted political order. The Article ‘guaran-
tee[s]’ electors ‘free expression of … will’ in ‘periodic elections’ (ICCPR:
Article 25), but without guaranteeing that this expressed will ‘shall be the
basis of the authority of government’ (UDHR: Article 29). The wording
‘without unreasonable restrictions’ furthermore suggests that there are
reasonable limits to ‘the right and… opportunity’ of ‘citizen[s]’ to political
participation and ‘public service’ (ICCPR: Article 25). As the substance
of these words is unspecified, the determining their content is left to
governments.
The same pattern basically marks the ICESCR, which states in Article 2:
Each State Party … undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and tech-
nical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized … by all appro-
priate means, including the adoption of legislative measures.
However, although ‘The States Parties’ are said ‘to guarantee that the
rights enunciated … will be exercised without discrimination’, the article
allows ‘Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their
national economy,’ to ‘determine to what extent they would guarantee the
economic rights recognized … to non-nationals’ (ICESCR: Article 2). As
Article 4 adds, ‘The States Parties may subject such rights only to such
limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible
with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare in a democratic society’ (ICESCR).46
Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR again make humans, not governments,
primarily responsible for the realization of human rights. Furthermore,
while these treaties establish a framework for the realization of human
rights, they allow governments a significant discretion to limit human rights.
Governments prescribe the content of human rights and determine which
institutional setting and human conduct are adequate for such rights and the
exercise thereof. In doing so, they grant humans only thin political rights
which, practically and conceptually, sidestep humans and their rights as the
origin of power exercised by governments. As the central means of humans’
realization of civil and political rights, the ICCPR presents (national) law
and ‘effective remedy’, which must be ‘claim[ed]’, the ‘rights thereto deter-
mined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities’, and
46 Trade unions are one specific example for the application of such ‘restrictions’ (ICESCR:
Article 8).




























































































































which ‘competent authorities shall enforce … when granted’ (Article 2).47
The ICESCR, in turn, does not mention remedy, but legislation and other
means (Article 2), including economic growth and education (Article
6, 13).48All this implies that, ultimately, humansmust themselves undertake
the realization of their (prescribed) rights.
Compared with eighteenth-century constitutional practice, these
twentieth-century exemplars of global constitutionalization establish a fun-
damentally different pattern of relationships between humans and their
governments. Three such differences especially need to be stressed. First,
such international documents tie the real and true existence of human rights
to humans’ belief in and their recognition of such rights. In doing so, the
documents delegate the primary responsibility for respecting and realizing
human rights to humans. The UN Charter even portrays humans as prom-
ising each other their acceptance of this responsibility and joint efforts to
meet it through conduct. Second, international documents present govern-
ments as assisting and guiding humans in achieving human rights as
humans’ own responsibility. For example, governments provide humans
with an understanding of the meaning and implications of their rights
(UDHR; ICCPR; ICESCR) or supervise them in maintaining peace
(UN Charter). Thus, governments act as facilitators of the humans’ fulfil-
ment of the responsibility to realize human rights, rather than these govern-
ments having the primary obligation to protect these rights. Given their role,
governments may, in circumstances such as during a ‘time of public emer-
gency’ (ICCPR) or the development of ‘their national economy’ (ICESCR),
deviate from their duty to protect human rights. Finally, international
documents interrelate humans and governments to the effect that govern-
ments bind their peoples in the name of humanity, and indeed so bind all
people through human rights. Governments claim to speak in the name of
their peoples, as both particular peoples and as members of humanity
generally, and are (inter-)governmentally authorized to do so. By the same
47 The ICCPR’s Article 2 mentions ‘legislative or other measures’ as the means ‘to give effect
to the rights recognized’. Moreover, the ICCPR repeatedly alludes to an (alleged) opposition
between ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘lawfulness’ (see, for example, Article 6, 9, 12, 17).
48 In addition to being a right, education ‘shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a
free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial,
ethnic or religious groups’ (ICESCR: Article 13). The ICESCR’s Article 6 refers to ‘the right to
work’ and ‘technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques
[as means] to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive
employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the
individual’ (similar Article 11). Other non-legal means include health and hygiene or ‘the
conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture’, including respect for





























































































































means, governments make humans primarily responsible for human rights
and prescribe the content of these rights, while taking responsibility them-
selves only for working towards an institutional environment that enables
humans to have those rights when they are actively sought. The correspond-
ing state obligations are thus rather weak or remain indirect. Moreover,
governments even limit humans’ free exercise of human rights by subordi-
nating it to existing international law and cooperation and granting them-
selves exceptional provisions.
Consequently, at the global level pouvoir constitué takes the place of
pouvoir constituant. Global constitutional practice shifts focus from the
relations between humans and governments and human rights as the ‘basis
and foundation of [any] government’ (VBR) to the relations between
humans and their human rights conduct. In obliging humans rather than
governments to observe such rights, the two are decoupled. Furthermore,
this practice reduces the room for politics as ameans for allowing humans to
realize their rights. A legalistic approach to human rights and a turn to socio-
economic progress replace the political moment of human rights as estab-
lished in eighteenth-century constitutional documents. Humans must thus
seek their human rights within constituted order. In effectively reversing the
eighteenth-century constitution, this would imply a fundamental constitu-
tional change.
IV. From constitutional continuity to change and critique
As constitutional practice, global constitutional documents change the space
for constitutional thinking and conduct. They enable a new mode of con-
stitutional government that requires humans to promote human rights that
governments globally ‘grant’ or ‘take away’ (Lauterpacht, cited in Kosken-
niemi 2011b: 155). While such documents derive much of their normative
purchase from amodern constitutional tradition, they in fact undermine this
tradition. Based on a comparison of how global and historical constitutional
documents interrelate ‘humans’ and their ‘government’, this article suggests
that constitutional practice at the global level has been re-made, and indeed
reversed. It is this practice that turns the historical relationship between
pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué on its head. This transformation
is epitomized by the language ‘We, the Heads of State and Government and
High Representatives’ (GCM2019) used in UNGA documents since at least
the 2000s (see fn 1). To ‘not … be governed like that’ (Foucault 1997:
44, emphasis in original), the ‘new normativity’ of constitutional practice
at the global level needs to be addressed. This suggests scholars should




























































































































undertake further scrutiny of constitutionalization as a historically contin-
gent social process, rather than presuming what it can and cannot imply.
As their historical comparison reveals, global constitutional documents,
such as the UNCharter, the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, constitute
an executive, juridist and developmentalist constitutionalism. This stands in
contrast to the popular constitutionalism of the eighteenth century. The
global constitutional documents (re)allocate the responsibility for human
rights primarily to humans, instead of governments. Essentially, to have
human rights, humansmust recognize and realize these rights themselves. In
doing so, governments guide and support humans, but are themselves only
weakly bound by such rights. All this is declared by government represen-
tatives. While subjecting the human exercise of human rights to existing
international law and (economic) cooperation, governments grant them-
selves exceptional provisions in the name of (public) security or develop-
ment. Additionally, they replace politics with law and (further) development
as the primary means by which humans may vindicate their human rights.
This pattern differs significantly from eighteenth-century constitutional
documents, which originated from humans, as the people, and their repre-
sentatives. Such documents declared rights unambiguously as well as
inalienably vested in humans by nature and God vis-à-vis a government.
Governments had to recognize and respect these rights, thus allowing
humans to exercise them. Humans, meanwhile, had the right (and duty)
to ultimately resist a government that consistently failed to respect such
rights.
This new art of constitutional government at the global level resonates
with familiar accounts of a global power shift towards the executive,49 but
the reallocation of the primary responsibility for human rights to humans
complicates the picture. This prompts the question of how global constitu-
tional practice relates to the shift in government associated with neoliberal-
ism, as a mode of government, thinking and conduct (e.g. Gill and Cutler
2014). Certain aspects of constitutional practice, both global and historical,
particularly deserve further exploration. Given its centrality to constitu-
tional practice, the conceptualization of ‘humanity’ and its inherent exclu-
sions require greater attention. In addition, the relationship between global
constitutional practice and globalization, and their interactions with local
constitutional practice, deserve further study. The empirical focus of such
research should include further global, local, historical and non-Euro-
49 The new art of global constitutional government is also a new empire of governments. As
Koskenniemi (2011a: 73) and Tully (2007) note, constitutionalism does not exclude empire or





























































































































American constitutional texts, legal interpretations, policies and the activity
of non-governmental organizations.
The constitution is an art of government, thinking and conduct. As such, it
is shaped by and varies with the pattern of how constitutional practice
constitutes (as a power effect) the human–government relationship.50 The
constitution is thus both social and historical. Taking this into account, this
article has advanced a critical account of the remaking of the constitution in
global constitutional practice. The purpose has been genealogical rather
than explanatory in exploring the historicizing potential of reflexive
accounts in global constitutionalism. Critique of global constitutional prac-
tice cannot be achieved by invoking the historical relationship between
pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué, a classical cosmopolitanism,
or a traditional recourse to law (Kennedy 2007). Arguments like these lack
plausibility given the reversed constitution’s disconnect between humans
and governments, and because this constitution is also the historical product
and condition of legal practice. As a ‘question of attitude’ (Foucault 1997:
67) or democratic ethos (Tully 2002b: 536), critical constitutionalism
requires us to situate global constitutionalization and its counter-
Enlightenment tendencies within an historical account of constitutionaliza-
tion as practice.
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